Originally published on LinkedIn on 7 September 2026. This work is AI-assisted - read about how I work.
The DRC has had one Mining Code since 2002. Not Zambia’s five mining laws in fifty years, but one statute, amended once, governing the world’s largest cobalt producer. The first pattern is one code used twice: first to bring mining in, then to claim more of what it leaves behind.
I work around mining law, but the DRC is not my jurisdiction.
The 2002 Code was written to attract investment. It did. Titles and production multiplied. By 2018, however, the legislature’s conclusion was that fiscal and social returns had not kept pace.
It did not replace the Code. It changed what the Code was for.
Cobalt, coltan and germanium were designated strategic minerals. For cobalt producers, the royalty rose from 2% under the original Code to 10%. Artisanal mining was reserved for adult Congolese nationals working through licensed cooperatives. The direction was clear: from attracting capital towards retaining value, ownership and benefit.
Four provisions show the architecture.
Article 71 gives the State a 10% free-carried interest when an exploitation permit is granted, increasing by another 5% at each renewal.
Article 71 bis requires 10% of mining company capital to be held by Congolese citizens. After years of incomplete implementation, a government moratorium expired on 31 July 2026. The test is now enforcement.
Article 258 bis requires operators to contribute at least 0.3% of turnover to community development.
Article 242 divides royalties among central government (44%), the province (23%), the decentralised territory (14%), FOMIN, the future-generations fund (8%), and FONAREV (11%), funding reparations for victims of conflict-related sexual violence and crimes against the peace and security of humanity. In the DRC, even a royalty formula carries the country’s history.
Yet independent reviews record delays between statutory allocations and what reaches provinces and territories.
A second pattern runs beside the first. Across the region, mining law struggles to reconcile the perception of windfall when prices and profits rise with the reality of scarcity when prices fall, grades decline and costs remain.
The DRC is its clearest expression. The 2018 amendment increased the public claim on mineral value. Cobalt has since endured hostile economics: Glencore placed Mutanda on care and maintenance in 2019, primarily because of low prices, although the heavier fiscal burden mattered. Copper and gold have not faced a prolonged downturn. Kibali continued, Kamoa-Kakula was built, Tenke expanded and Mutanda reopened.
The 2002 Code asked whether mining would come. The 2018 amendment asks how much of what mining produces should remain in the DRC, and who should receive it. Beneath both lies the harder question: can a fiscal settlement shaped by the perception of windfall survive the return of scarcity?
That question remains open.



